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The historian Raphael Falk has described the gene as a ‘concept in tension’ (Falk 2000) –
an idea pulled this way and that by the differing demands of different kinds of biological
work. Several authors have suggested that in the light of contemporary molecular biology
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‘gene’ is no more than a handy term which acquires a specific meaning only in a specific
scientific context in which it occurs. Hence the best way to answer the question ‘what is a
gene’, and the only way to provide a truly philosophical answer to that question is to
outline the diversity of conceptions of the gene and the reasons for this diversity. In this
essay we draw on the extensive literature in the history of biology to explain how the
concept has changed over time in response to the changing demands of the biosciences1.
Finally, we outline some of the conceptions of the gene current today. The seeds of
change are implicit in many of those current conceptions and the future of the gene
concept looks set to be at as turbulent as the past.
The instrumental gene
In the first three decades of genetic research the gene had a dual identity (Falk 1986,
2005). Genes, or Mendelian factors, were intervening variables defined by the Mendelian
pattern of inheritance. From this perspective, the fact that some trait of an organism can
be resolved into one or more Mendelian characters establishes definitively that there are
genes for those characters. Indeed, it seems that at least some of the earliest Mendelians
did not clearly distinguish between the Mendelian character itself and the Mendelian
factor ‘underlying’ it. That distinction was made clear by Wilhelm Johannsen’s
introduction of the terms ‘phenotype’ and ‘genotype’ in 1909.  But as well as intervening
variables, genes were also hypothetical material constituents of the cell whose physical
                                                 
1 We have drawn on the work of Raphael Falk (1986; 1991; 1995; 2000; 2001; 2001; 2005; In Press),
Michael Dietrich (2000; 2000), Robert Olby (1974; 1985), Petter Portin (1993), Margo Vicedo (2000) and
Michael Morange (1998). When our historical claims are commonplaces that can be found in several of
these authors we do not cite specific works in their support. We have also chosen not to explain basic
genetic terminology, as this would have occupied much of the article. More specialized terms are explained
when they cannot be avoided.
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transmission from parent to offspring causally explained the Mendelian pattern of
inheritance. In his Nobel Prize acceptance speech Thomas Hunt Morgan, the father of
classical genetics, noted, “There is not consensus of opinion amongst geneticists as to
what genes are – whether they are real or purely fictitious – because at the level at which
genetic experiments lie, it does not make the slightest difference whether the gene is a
hypothetical unit, or whether the gene is a material particle” (1933, quoted in Falk 1986,
148). In our view, one of the clearest themes in the century-long evolution of the concept
of the gene is the dialectic between these two conceptions of the gene, a structural
conception anchored first in cytology and later in biochemistry, and a functional
conception anchored in the observable results of hybridizations, at first between
organisms and later directly between DNA molecules.
Recent scholarship has stressed the fact that ‘classical genetics’ was not merely a theory
of heredity, but at least as importantly an experimental practice – ‘genetic analysis’ - in
which the regularities postulated by the Mendelian theory of heredity were used to
address other questions about the structure and function of living systems (Waters 2004;
Falk In Press). This experimental practice imposed strong constraints on the concept of
the gene. In the earliest days of Mendelian genetics, William Castle’s hybridization
experiments with hooded rats challenged the discreteness and constancy of Mendelian
factors. In those experiments alleles appeared to be ‘contaminated’ by the alleles they had
shared a cell with in previous generations. The resulting debate exposed a circularity of
argumentation: ‘unit factors’ (individual Mendelian genes) can only be identified by their
effect on ‘unit characters’ (those which display a single, consistent Mendelian pattern of
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inheritance), but how can a unit character be delimited that is supposed to stand for a unit
factor? This circularity was resolved by definition: Mendelizing traits are determined by a
single gene, and non-Mendelizing traits are controlled by more than one gene. The
instrumental gene is by definition a Mendelizing unit - it is there to do a job that depends
on this stipulation. The visible, heritable characters of organisms must be interpreted in
such a way as to permit genetic analysis of those traits. If a character does not correspond
to a gene then it must be decomposed into simpler characters that do (later described as
‘primary characters’). In the same spirit, quantitative traits, which vary continuously
between individuals and thus cannot occur in Mendelian ratios, came to be treated as the
effect of many hypothetical genes each of which makes an equal and inseparable
contribution to the character, giving rise to the discipline of quantitative genetics.
The Material Gene
The Morgan school rapidly established the chromosomal theory of heredity, according to
which genes are arranged in a linear fashion along the chromosomes that cytologists had
observed in the cell nucleus. They were able to explain many deviations from the
standard Mendelian pattern of inheritance in terms of the observable behavior of
chromosomes.  Most importantly, they were able to closely correlate the linkage maps
generated by genetic analysis with observable changes in the structure of chromosomes,
an achievement facilitated by the discovery of huge, polytenic chromosomes in the
salivary glands of Drosophila. Linkage was thus both a (functional) measure of the
probability that two genes would be inherited together and a (structural) fact about the
relative position of visible bands on the salivary gland chromosomes.  But despite these
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achievements, most members of the Morgan school did not concern themselves with the
material nature of genes, both because this was not a question that could be pursued via
genetic analysis and because the pursuit of genetic analysis did not require it to be
answered.
“Molecular biology was born when geneticists, no longer satisfied with a quasi-abstract
view of the role of genes, focused on the problem of the nature of genes and their
mechanism of
action” (Morange 1998, 2). Foremost amongst these was Herman J. Muller, a student of
Morgan not satisfied by the purely instrumental notion of the gene as an unknown
physical entity localized on chromosomes. For Muller these particulate, atomic entities
were the basis, the ‘secret’ of life, and the essential entities on which the Darwinian
process of evolution rests. In order to fulfill these functions genes needed to have the
properties of autocatalysis (self replication) to make them units of heredity,
heterocatalysis to allow them to contribute to the phenotype, and mutability to create
heritable variation. Muller set up a research programme to study the material nature of
the gene and reveal the physical basis of these properties. In 1927 Muller discovered the
mutagenic effect of x-rays and used this to make the first estimates of the physical size of
an individual gene.
For our purposes, Muller’s emphasis on the material gene is important because of his
commitment to finding an epistemic pathway to the gene that bypassed the observed
effect of the gene of the phenotype. When this commitment started to bear fruit it became
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possible to advance a concept of the gene that abandoned some of the commitments
required if genes were to be epistemically accessible via genetic analysis. Features of the
gene which previously could not be meaningfully called into question – and which were
thus treated as definitional – became features which could be tested and potentially
rejected.
The material nature of the gene was progressively revealed by the new discipline of
biochemistry, which came into being in the inter-war years. One aim of this discipline
was to understand the synthesis of the agents of organic specificity – organic molecules
that interact only with a very narrow class of other molecules and thus enable the very
precise chemistry required by living systems. From the mid-1930s it became increasingly
clear that the specificity of organic molecules is explained by conformation and weak
interactions between molecules. The conformation of a molecule is its three-dimensional
shape, which determines whether specific sites on molecules can come together. The
interactions between those sites are much weaker than the covalent bonds of standard
inorganic chemistry, so that interactions between, and the conformation of individual,
molecules can be altered by relatively low energies. These principles turned out to apply
to the structure and functioning of all forms of life (Morange 1998, 15). The concept of
specificity rapidly came to be applied to the relationship between genes and their
products, as well as to the relationship between enzymes and their substrates.
If the activity of the cell is explained in terms of molecular specificity it is natural to
suppose that the effects of genes on phenotypes are mediated by the production of
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biomolecules with appropriate specificity. Thus in 1941 the ‘one gene-one enzyme’
hypothesis was born which helped to forge an experimental association between
biochemistry and genetics. George Beadle and Edward Tatum chose to attack the
problem of gene action by genetic analysis of a known biochemical process. They
produced and isolated mutant strains of the fungus Neurospora each unable to synthesize
one of several chemicals involved in a single biosynthetic pathway. Genetic analysis of
these mutants showed that each deficiency was the result of a mutation in a single gene.
Only three years later Oswald T. Avery produced experimental evidence that genes were
made of DNA. Looking back, his evidence seems compelling, but it needed another eight
years and a different line of experiment for it to change the received ‘protein model of the
gene’. If the relationship between genes and enzymes was one of specificity, like the
relationship between enzymes and their substrates, then it seemed unlikely that DNA
could be responsible for ‘genetic specificity’. The little that was known about DNA
suggested it was an unspecific and monotonous molecule, perhaps with a structural role
in the chromosome.
Historians have stressed the very substantial changes in approach produced by the influx
of scientists trained in physics into biology during the 1940s. These changes brought
genetics and biochemistry closer together and paved the way for the molecular
conception of the gene that prevailed from the 1950s to the 1970s. One of these former
physicists, Max Delbrück, was convinced that understanding the secret of life would
require a physical approach and an organism as simple and pure as a bacterial virus – an
organism so simple that it could be conceived as a naked gene. The bacteriophage
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appeared to have hardly more than the one key characteristic of life, self-replication, and
was thus deemed perfect to study this property “without opening the biochemical ‘black
box’” (Morange 1998, 45). The ‘phage group’ around Max Delbruck, Salvador Luria and
Alfred Hershey helped to establish bacterial genetics and the prokaryotic age in genetic
research.
Doing without genes?
The clash between the leading geneticist Richard Goldschmidt and his contemporaries in
the 1940s and early 50s provides further insight into the classical gene concept. The
successes of the Morgan school in determining the linear order of genes on chromosomes
allowed the discovery of ‘position effects’ in which a change in the relative position of
genes on the chromosome is associated with a change in their phenotypic effects. This in
turn raises questions concerning the nature of mutation. Today we define a mutation as
any heritable change in the nucleotide sequence of a chromosome, which may occur
either by the substitution of one nucleotide for another or by the translocation or
inversion of a chromosome segment. In classical genetics, however, mutation was
necessarily defined as a change in the intrinsic nature of an individual gene manifest in a
heritable difference in phenotype. Mutations were thus distinguished from position
effects, in which an intrinsically identical gene has a different effect because it has
changed its location. Goldschmidt challenged this distinction. As there was no direct
evidence that chromosomes have distinctive structural parts corresponding to individual
genes he suggested that ‘mutations’ and ‘position effects’ were simply smaller and larger
changes in the structure of the chromosome. Because chromosomal changes on very
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different scales were known to have phenotypic effects, Goldschmidt argued that
chromosomes probably contained a hierarchy of units of function. Famously, he denied
that ‘genes’ exist, by which he meant that that no unique structural unit corresponded to
the unit of function of classical genetics. Although “Goldschmidt’s efforts from 1940 to
1958 stand out as one of the first attempts to develop a theory which integrated models of
genetic structure, genetic action, developmental processes and evolutionary dynamics”
(Dietrich 2000, 738) his views were completely unacceptable to most of his
contemporaries. Effectively, Goldschmidt was insisting that both aspects of the dual
identity of the classical gene converge on a single unit – the material gene must
correspond to the instrumental unit of genetic analysis. Evidence to the contrary is thus
evidence that there are no genes in the classical sense. Goldschmidt’s contemporaries
perhaps differed in that they were more hopeful that future discoveries would reveal a
unique unit of genetic function at the molecular level. They certainly differed in their
commitment to continuing existing lines of research and unwillingness to undertake the
radical reorientation that Goldschmidt was suggesting.
‘Neo-Classical’ Genetics and the Molecular Gene
By the mid 1950s DNA was established as the genetic material, its structure had been
analyzed by Francis Crick and James Watson (1953), and Crick had stated the ‘Central
Dogma’ of molecular biology and its related ‘sequence hypothesis’ (1958): the linear
sequence of nucleotides in a segment of a DNA molecule determines the linear sequence
of nucleotides in an RNA molecule by chemical specificity, while that molecule in turn
determines the sequence of amino acids in a protein by ‘informational specificity’, that is,
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via the genetic code whose details were to be elucidated in the early 1960s. The same
period saw a sea-change in the gene concept itself, one that Petter Portin has labeled the
transition from the ‘classical’ to the ‘neo-classical’ gene (Portin 1993). It may appear
slightly confusing that the latter conception has also been labeled the ‘classical molecular
gene’ (Neumann-Held 1998), but as Portin’s ‘neo-classicism’ is precisely a
molecularized classicism, the two names are complementary.
The new, molecular concept of the gene was the result of technical developments that
allowed much more detailed maps of the chromosome (‘fine structure mapping’) and the
interpretation of the results of this enhanced form of genetic analysis in the light of the
new understanding of the material gene. The new conception departed from the classical
in recognizing that the gene is not the fundamental unit of mutation or of genetic
recombination. Recombination in classical genetics was the process in which alleles from
two copies of a chromosome were combined on a single copy as a result of crossing over
between homologous chromosome pairs during meiosis. Recombination was thus
recombination of an allele of one gene with an allele of another gene, so that genes
themselves were the minimal unit of recombination. Working with bacteriophage from
1954 to 1961 Seymour Benzer was able to increase the resolution of the ‘cis-trans’ or
‘complementation’ test so as to map out in detail the location of different mutations
within the same gene and demonstrated conclusively that recombination can occur
between different parts of a single gene. Two mutations are said to be in cis-position
when they are on the same copy of a chromosome. They are in trans-position when one is
on each of two homologous chromosomes. The logic of the cis-trans test depends on the
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fact that most mutations are recessive in the heterozygote. Hence, if an offspring derives
a mutant allele of one gene from one parent and a mutant allele of another gene from the
other parent, it should also receive a mutation-free, functional copy of each gene from the
other parent and appear phenotypically normal. If, however, an offspring receives
different mutation from each parent, but they are in the same gene, then it will have no
mutation-free copy of that gene and will be a phenotypic mutant. Thus, crossing two
mutant lines to produce offspring with the two mutations in trans-position tests whether
they are in the same gene. If, however, genetic recombination can occur within a single
gene, then a small proportion of the offspring of a cross between carriers of two different
mutant alleles of the same gene will receive a copy of the gene which recombines the
undamaged portion from one mutant allele with the undamaged portion from the other
mutant allele and is thus restored to normal function. Benzer used an analogue of the cis-
trans test in bacteriophage to demonstrate that the gene as a functional unit defined by the
cis-trans test (the ‘cistron’) can be represented as a linear recombination map of mutated
sites. This acknowledgment led him to distinguish between units of recombination,
‘recons’, mutation, ‘mutons’, and genetic function, the ‘cistron’.
Benzer’s work could have been seen as a vindication of Goldschmidt and other
skepticism about the unified, particulate gene (Holmes 2000; Falk 2005). But this was not
how it was viewed by his contemporaries. Instead, the cistron was more or less
immediately identified with the gene. From this followed the conventional gene concept
of molecular biology. One reason the results were interpreted in this way was that the
physical structure of the DNA molecule was now known and offered a natural
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interpretation for Benzer’s findings. The unit of recombination and mutation is the single
nucleotide, whilst the unit of genetic function (heterocatalysis) is the sequence of
nucleotides from which a single RNA is transcribed, corresponding to a single protein,
and thus vindicating the existing doctrine of ‘one gene - one enzyme’.
Challenges to the classical molecular gene concept
By the mid 1960s many scientists thought that the major problems of molecular genetics
had been solved, and were inclined to leave other investigators “to iron out the details”
(Stent 1968). But the claim that ‘what is true for E. coli is true for the elephant’ turned
out to be premature, and it seems unlikely that molecular geneticists will find themselves
out of work anytime soon. According to the classical molecular conception a gene is a
series of contiguous nucleotides whose sequence corresponds to the sequence of amino
acids in a single polypeptide chain (one or more of which that makes up a protein). It was
soon realized that some genes code for functional RNAs that are not translated to a
protein, but this fact is easily accommodated by the classical conception. As C. Kenneth
Waters has stressed, the fundamental molecular gene concept is that of a DNA sequence
that determines the stricture of some gene product by linear correspondence (Waters
1994, 2000). The molecular gene is the ‘image in the DNA’ of the molecule whose
biological activity is of interest to the experimenter (Rob D. Knight, pers. comm.). The
classical molecular gene seemed to unite the two identities of the classical gene in a
single natural unit. The functional definition of the gene that underlay genetic analysis
and the structural definition of the material gene had turned out to be two ways to pick
out the very same thing. Looked at more closely, however, the functional definition had
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been significantly revised so as to take account of findings about the material gene. In
Muller’s original vision genes reproduce themselves (autocatalysis), influence the
phenotype (heterocatalysis) and mutate. The classical molecular gene, however, is not the
unit of replication, which is the whole DNA molecule of which it is a part. Nor is it the
unit of mutation. The only function with respect to which the molecular gene is the unit
of function is that of contributing to the phenotype (Muller’s heterocatalysis). So the
functional role of the gene was revised to fit the molecular reality that had been
uncovered. Furthermore, the concept of the gene was restricted to sequences that fulfilled
this new functional role: not all segments of chromosomes that behave as Mendelian
factors count as genes under the new conception. Untranscribed regulatory regions not
immediately adjacent to the coding sequences they regulate can segregate independently
of those coding sequences, and so can function as separate Mendelian factors, but they
are not separate molecular genes. Nevertheless, the classical molecular gene was a highly
successful example of the research strategy of identifying a functional role, searching for
the mechanism that fulfills that role at a lower level of analysis, and using knowledge of
that mechanism to refine understanding of function at the original (in this case
phenotypic) level of analysis.
Since the 1970s, however, further investigation of the underlying structural unit has
tended to undermine the idea that the revised functional role of the gene – determining
the structure of a gene product - is filled by natural units of structure at the level of the
DNA. The structures in the genome that play a gene-like role need not be physically
distinct: they can overlap one another or occur inside one another (in the same direction
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on the DNA molecule or in reverse). The relationship between structural genes and gene-
like functions is not one-to-one but many-to-many: some gene products are made from
more than one structural gene and individual structural genes make multiple products.
Finally, the sequence of elements in the gene product depends on much more than the
sequence of nucleotides in the structural gene: different sequence elements can be
repeated, scrambled and reversed in the product and the precise sequence of a gene
product can reflect post-transcriptional and translational processing as well as the original
DNA sequence. To put flesh on these bones we will briefly describe some of these
mechanisms and give an example2.
In eukaryotes (organisms whose cells have a nucleus and organelles, including fungi,
plants and animals) the DNA sequence is transcribed into a pre-messenger RNA from
which the final RNA transcript is processed by cutting out large non-coding sequences,
called introns, and splicing together the remaining coding sequences, the exons.
Biologists speak of alternative cis-splicing when more than one mature mRNA transcript
results from these processes through the cutting and joining of alternative exons3.
Adjacent genes are sometimes cotranscribed, that is, transcribed together to produce a
single pre-mRNA that is then spliced. Splicing may also occur between a gene and an
adjacent ‘pseudo gene’ that would be incapable of producing a product on its own.
Alternative gene products may also be derived from so-called 'overlapping genes'. In
                                                 
2 For more details and references, see (Stotz and Griffiths 2004; Stotz, Bostanci, and Griffiths In Press).
3 In contemporary usage, cis- elements are those transcribed together as parts of a single pre-mRNA
whereas trans- elements are transcribed separately and united at some stage of post-transcriptional
processing (trans-splicing). Thus trans- elements in the modern sense (trans on mRNA) may be cis-
located on the DNA.
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these cases, the 'genes', in the sense of the ‘open reading frames’ (ORFs) which are
transcribed into RNA, are not lined up like so many pearls on a string, but instead may
overlap one another or even be completely contained one within another. While some
cases of alternative splicing produce a range of proteins that are structurally related to one
another, in other cases the products are quite different from each other (in which case
they are often described as products of overlapping genes, rather than alternative splicing
of the same gene). The degree of difference between the products depends on the extent
of overlap between their exons, and on whether these shared sequences are read in the
same reading frame. It is the precise nucleotide at which reading begins that determines
which codons a DNA sequence contains. Starting at a different nucleotide is called
‘frameshift’, a phenomenon that would look like this in an English sentence: ‘A gene is a
flexible entity’ becomes ‘Age nei saf lex ibl een tit y’. The difference to any human
language, however, is that no matter how it is read a DNA sequence will always be made
up of meaningful ‘three-letter-words’ (codons that specify an amino acid during
translation). This means that very different products can be read from the same sequence
merely by frameshifting by one nucleotide. As well as alternative transcripts from a DNA
sequence, multiple simultaneous transcripts can occur, as is the case of the parallel
processing of functional non-coding RNAs (such as microRNAs) from the intronic
regions of the premature transcript, which may be involved in the regulation of coding
transcript of the same gene.
In the process of trans-splicing a final mRNA transcript is processed from two or more
independently transcribed pre-mRNAs. While the prefix trans might suggest that these
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pre-mRNAs are derived from DNA sequences far apart from each other, this is by no
means always the case. In fact, two copies of the very same sequence can be spliced
together this way, as can alternative exons in what would at first glance looks like a
‘normal’ case of cis-splicing. Moreover, until very recently it was thought that only one
strand of DNA is transcribed, but in fact DNA can be read both forwards and backwards
by the cellular machinery, producing either different or matching (complementary)
products. The latter case, in which exactly the same sequence is read in reverse, will
result in an antisense transcript with likely regulatory function, possibly through silencing
its complementary transcript. RNA editing is another mechanism of modification that can
significantly diversify the ‘transcriptome’ or ‘proteome’ (the total compliment of final
transcripts or proteins in the cells of an organism). Whereas most other forms of
posttranscriptional modifications of mRNA (capping, polyadenilation and cis-splicing)
retain the correspondence of the primary structure of coding sequence and gene product,
RNA editing disturbs this correspondence by changing the primary sequence of mRNA
after its transcription. The creation of ‘cryptogenes’ via RNA editing can potentially have
radical effects on the final product, depending on whether editing changes the sense of
the codon in which it occurs. While there are likely as many varieties of RNA editing as
there are organisms, all belong to one of three known mechanisms: the site-specific
insertion or deletion of one or several nucleotides, or nucleotide substitution (cytidine-to-
uridine and adenosine-to-inosine deamination, uridine-to-cytidine transamination) .
Although we will not describe them here, other processes may occur before the final
mRNA transcript is translated into a protein sequence or processed into a functional
RNA. The relationship between DNA and gene product is indirect and mediated to an
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extent that was never anticipated when the basic mechanisms of transcription, RNA
processing and translation were clarified in the 1960s.
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Figure 1. A contemporary molecular gene. Lines denote introns, boxes denote exons.
Subunit 1 of the respiratory chain NADH dehydrogenase is encoded by the gene nad1,
which in the mitochondrial genomes of flowering plants is fragmented into five coding
segments that are scattered over at least 40kb of DNA sequence and interspersed with
other unrelated coding sequences. In wheat (illustrated) the five exons that together
encode the polypeptide of 325 amino acids, require one cis-splicing event (between the
exons b/c) and three trans-splicing events (between exons a/b, c/d and d/e) for assembly
of the open reading frame. In addition, RNA editing is required, including a C to U
substitution to create the initiation codon for this ORF. In some mosses and in mammals
the ORF for NAD1 is an uninterrupted stretch of nuclear genomic DNA. Finally, in
wheat, a separate, ORF for a maturase enzyme (mat-r) is encoded in the intron upstream
of exon e (Chapdelaine and Bonen 1991).
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The modern gene
The ‘modern gene’ as Portin (1993) has termed it represents a further stage in the
dialectic of structure and function described above. The classical gene, primarily defined
by the functional role it played in heredity, came to be identified with the structural gene
revealed by early molecular biology, primarily through the study of prokaryotes and
bacteriophage. As a result, the functional role of the gene came to be re-defined as the
determination, by linear correspondence, of the structure of a gene product. Further
investigation of the manner in which a wider range of genomes generate a wider range of
gene products has revealed that this functional role can be filled by diverse, highly
flexible mechanisms at the level of the DNA itself: “We are currently left with a rather
abstract, open and generalized concept of the gene, even though our comprehension of
the structure and organization of the genetic material has greatly increased.” (Portin 1993,
173). Goldschmidt’s critique of the particulate gene has been explicitly revived in the
light of our new understanding of genome structure and function:  “The particular gene
has shaped thinking in the biological sciences over the past century. But attempts to
translate such a complex concept into a discrete physical structure with clearly defined
boundaries were always likely to be problematic, and now seem doomed to failure.
Instead, the gene has become a flexible entity with borders that are defined by a
combination of spatial organization and location, the ability to respond specifically to a
particular set of cellular signals, and the relationship between expression patterns and the
final phenotypic effect.” (Dillon 2003, 457) In a prescient paper twenty years ago,
Raphael Falk reviewed what were then newly emerging challenges to the classical
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molecular gene and concluded that “Today the gene is not just the material unit or the
instrumental unit of inheritance, but rather a unit, a segment that corresponds to a unit-
function, as defined by the individual experimentalist’s need. It is neither discrete – there
are overlapping genes, nor continuous – there are intron within genes, nor does it have a
constant location – there are transposons, nor a clearcut function – there are pseudogenes,
not even constant sequences – there are consensus sequences, nor definite borderlines –
there are variable sequences both ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’”. Thus, as early as 1986
we were well on the way from the “well defined material entity back to an abstraction, a
hypothetical construct, if not an intervening variable, devised by scientist for their needs”
(Falk 1986, 169, 160).
Focusing on the cutting-edge of contemporary genomics can induce an extremely
deflationary view of the gene. Some molecular biologists, realizing that the concepts of
'gene’ transcription or ‘gene’ expression may not suffice to capture the variation in
expressed genomic sequences, have proposed the more general term of “genome
transcription” to allow for the incorporation of RNA transcripts that contain sequences
outside the border of canonical genes. This view does not sit easily with the classical
molecular conception of genes, which from the new perspective seem like “statistical
peaks within a wider pattern of genome expression” (Finta and Zaphiropoulos 2001). One
pragmatic, technological reason that today’s biologists are prepared to consider such
radical options is that the challenge of automated gene annotation has turned the
apparently semantic issue of the definition of ‘gene’ into a pressing and practical one as
the limitations of a purely structural, sequenced-based definition of the gene have become
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apparent. One influential recent review concludes that “One solution for annotating genes
in sequenced genomes may be to return to the original definition of a gene—a sequence
encoding a functional product—and use functional genomics to identify them.” (Snyder
and Gerstein 2003, 260)
The gene concept, however, plays a role in many other contexts besides the cutting-edge
of genomics (Stotz, Griffiths, and Knight 2004). We suggest, therefore, that there are at
least three answers to the question ‘what is a gene?’, none of which can be neglected if
we hope to accurately depict the state of contemporary biology. These are the traditional,
instrumental gene, the post-genomic molecular gene, and the ‘nominal gene’.
The traditional gene
Biologists can and do still use genetic analysis – the analysis of the phenomenon of
heredity by the analysis of the results of hybridization, either between organisms or
directly between DNA molecules (Waters 2004; Falk In Press). Genetic analysis remains
a key tool in addressing broader biological questions. For these purposes the gene
remains an intervening variable, defined by the inheritance patterns which it enables us to
follow, and the difficulties of providing a univocal account of its identity as a material
unit can be put to one side. The traditional gene concept is retained in much the same way
in population genetics. In an important recent analysis, Lenny D. Moss introduces the
term ‘Gene-P’ for something very like our ‘traditional’ gene (Moss 2003). The P stands
variously for ‘phenotype’, ‘prediction’ and ‘preformation’ since these genes are identified
in terms of their phenotypic effects, are used to predict the phenotypic results of
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hybridization, and reflect what Moss terms ‘instrumental preformationism’ – a strategic
neglect of the ways in which the gene-phene relationship depends upon other factors.
Moss contrasts his Gene-P to a materialistic concept of the gene which he calls ‘Gene-D’
(for ‘development’). Genes-D are defined by their intrinsic chemical capacity to template
for gene products. Here, we wish to distinguish two importantly different ways to
conceptualize genes that fall within the general area of conceptual space that Moss labels
Gene-D4.
The post-genomic molecular gene
We use this phrase to refer to the entities that continue to play the functional role of the
molecular gene – making gene products - in contemporary molecular biology. A post-
genomic molecular gene is the collections of sequence elements that is the ‘image’ of the
target molecule (the molecule whose activity we wish to understand) in the DNA,
however fragmented or distorted that image may be. These genes are ‘things you can do
with your genome’ (Stotz, Bostanci, and Griffiths In Press). This conception of the gene
remains a critical aspect of the epistemology of molecular bioscience simply because
linear correspondence between molecules is fundamental to biologists’ ability to identify
and manipulate them, via technologies ranging from cDNA libraries to microarrays to
RNA interference. But although it is important to know the ‘gene for’ some molecule in
this sense, it does not matter very much whether that collection of sequence elements is a
gene! To put it less paradoxically, the utility of knowing the DNA elements that underlie
                                                 
4 Moss (pers. Comm.) suggests that our “postgenomic molecular” and “nominal’ material genes are
perspectives on genes-D corresponding to what are, somewhat perversely, called “forward” and “reverse”
genetics. The postgenomic molecular gene embodies the traditional, “forward”, strategy of locating the
template resources corresponding to a known phenotype. The nominal gene is a template resource whose
use we set out to understand.
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the production of the target molecule or its precursors does not at all depend on whether it
is possible to give a univocal definition of the material gene. Finding the ‘gene for’ the
molecule in this sense remains important even on the most deflationary, post-genomic
view of the molecular gene.
Nominal gene
“The use of databases containing nucleotide sequences is well established.  Codified as
part of this process is a particular use of gene concepts on the basis of which one can
identify various genes and count the number of genes in a given genome.  … I call genes,
picked out in this way, nominal genes. A good way of parsing my argument is that
nominal genes are a useful device for ensuring that our discourse is anchored in
nucleotide sequences, but that nominal genes do not, and probably can not, pick out all,
only, or exactly the genes that are intended in many other parts of genetic work.” (Burian
2004, 64-5)
It is hard to argue with Burian that for many practical purposes genes are simply
sequences that have been annotated as genes and whose annotation as such has been
accepted by the scientific community. But, as Burian himself makes clear, this does not
imply that the scientific community has a clear understanding of what makes a sequence
a gene that needs only to be made explicit. Thomas Fogle has argued powerfully that this
is not the case (Fogle 2001). The working concept of the gene, according to Fogle, is
something like a stereotype or prototype: a sequence is a gene if it has enough similarities
to other genes, e.g. it contains an open reading frame, has one or more promoters, has one
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or more transcripts which are not too functionally diverse from one another, etc. This is
more or less a description of automated ‘gene discovery’ methods, and Fogle’s
suggestion is that the concept of the gene is no more principled or definition-like than
this. The various ‘gene-like’ features are not weighted against one another in any
principled, theory-driven way, but rather are weighted differently on different occasions
in order to segment the DNA sequence into fairly traditional looking ‘genes’, sometimes
giving up on structural criteria to save functional ones (as in cases of trans-splicing), at
other times giving up on functional criteria to save structural ones (as in co-transcription
of a gene and a ‘pseudo-gene’).
Fogle is quite critical of this state of affairs, arguing that by combining structural and
functional features into a single stereotype, what he calls the ‘consensus’ gene concept,
hides both the diversity of DNA sequences that can perform the same function and the
diverse functions of particular DNA sequences. Burian takes a more positive view,
emphasising the value of simply having a shared collection of named sequences known
or suspected to be involved in the production of gene products.
Conclusion
The gene began life as an intervening variable, defined functionally in terms of the
Mendelian pattern of heredity in observable phenotypic characters. It rapidly acquired a
second identity as a hypothetical material unit. A productive dialectic between
investigations of the gene which identified it in each of these two ways concluded with
the ‘neo-classical’ or ‘classical molecular’ conception of the gene. The functional role of
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the gene was redefined to exclude mutation and recombination, which became properties
of the DNA in its own right, rather than of individual genes. The function of the gene
became the determination of the structure of gene products via linear correspondence
between molecules. This functional role was played by a natural class of units at the
molecular level – the structurally defined molecular gene. Further investigation of a
wider range of genomes and a wider range of gene products has thrown into doubt
whether an adequate structural definition is possible - the structural basis upon which
gene products are generated may be a very broad class of ‘things you can do with your
genome’. At this point it remains possible to think of genes in the traditional manner that
dates back to the early 20th C as intervening variable in the genetic analysis of
phenotypes. It is also possible to think of them as the often complex collections of
sequence elements that fill the functional role of the molecular gene (‘post-genomic
molecular genes’). Finally, it is possible to think of genes as simply those sequences
whose similarity on various dimensions to stereotypical genes has led them to be
annotated as genes and whose annotation as such has been accepted by the scientific
community (‘nominal genes’).
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